A Higher Caliber of Regulation: Is Making Smart-Gun Technology Mandatory Constitutionally Permissible? by Kimberly, Tyler J.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 65 | Issue 1
2014
A Higher Caliber of Regulation: Is Making Smart-
Gun Technology Mandatory Constitutionally
Permissible?
Tyler J. Kimberly
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Tyler J. Kimberly, A Higher Caliber of Regulation: Is Making Smart-Gun Technology Mandatory Constitutionally Permissible?, 65 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 251 (2014)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol65/iss1/13
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
251 
 —  Comment  — 
A Higher Caliber of Regulation: 





I.  Smart Guns: Concerns, Goals, and Facts .................................... 253 
A.  An Overview of Smart-Gun Technology .......................................... 253 
B.  The Debate Surrounding Smart Guns ............................................. 255 
1.  Are Smart Guns Reliable? ............................................................. 255 
2.  Will Smart Guns Really Keep Guns Out of the Wrong Hands?.... 256 
3.  Expect to Pay a Premium Price .................................................... 258 
II.  Second Amendment Jurisprudence and an Analytical 
Framework ........................................................................................... 259 
A.  District of Columbia v. Heller ........................................................ 259 
1.  The Scope of the Second Amendment Under Heller ...................... 260 
2.  Lawful Regulations and Impermissible Violations of Second 
Amendment Rights ...................................................................... 261 
B.   Post-Heller Courts and Eugene Volokh’s Framework ...................... 264 
1.  Restrictions on “How,” “Who,” and “Expenses” According to 
Volokh. ......................................................................................... 264 
2.  Volokh’s Categories in Circuit Courts ........................................... 267 
a.  Bans Resulting from Domestic Misdemeanors as a “Who” 
Restriction ....................................................................... 267 
b.  Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, and the 
“How” Restriction. ........................................................... 269 
c.  Kwong v. Bloomberg and “Fee Jurisprudence” ..................... 271 
III.  Applying the Analysis to Smart-Gun Technology .................... 273 
A.  A “How” Restriction ..................................................................... 273 
B.  A “Who” Restriction .................................................................... 275 
C.  An “Expenses” Restriction ............................................................ 277 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 278 
Introduction  
Andy Raymond owns a gun store in Rockville, Maryland, called 
Engage Armament.1 In 2014, Raymond thought he could attract  
1. Steve Pokin, Proponents of “Smart Guns” Say NRA Is the Main 
Obstacle, Springfield News-Leader (Mo.), Aug. 3, 2014, at C7, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/03/ 
proponents-smart-guns-nra-obstacle/13551659/. 
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business by selling guns equipped with a new technology that 
prevented the gun from firing in the hands of anybody but the gun’s 
owner—so-called “smart guns.”2 Raymond did not intend to draw 
attention to himself by selling these guns, but he was thrust into the 
national spotlight by the gun’s manufacturer, Armatix.3 Raymond’s 
publicity triggered ardent reactions from those opposing the new 
technology, and Raymond began receiving degrading messages and 
death threats.4 Immediately, Raymond stopped offering the Armatix 
smart gun, but he did not understand why some people would object 
to the product.5 In response, another man in his community claimed 
that these guns were a mistake and that no “gun person” would ever 
want to own one.6 However, both supporters and critics of these new 
smart guns agreed that the technology is untested, making it unclear 
what the benefits or dangers may be.7 
This is an extreme example, but is meant to communicate the 
point that people disagree, quite passionately, on the extent to which 
the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms. The text of 
the amendment itself reads as follows: “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”8 A superficial reading of 
that text gives almost no indication on where the boundaries of its 
protections lie.9 In 2002, New Jersey tested those boundaries by 
enacting a law mandating that “[o]n the first day of the 24th month 
following the date on which the Attorney General reports that [smart 
guns] are available for retail sales purposes,” it will be illegal to sell 
guns in New Jersey that are not smart guns.10 
Now suppose in the next few years, New Jersey starts 
implementing its smart-gun law. Alternatively, suppose that Congress 
or another state legislature passes a similar law requiring that all guns 
manufactured or sold be equipped with smart-gun technology. Is 
there, as of right now, a basis in the Second Amendment for objecting 
to those laws? This Comment suggests that the answer to that  
2. Id.  
3. Id.  
4. Id.  
5. Id.  
6. Id.  
7. Id.  
8. U.S. Const. amend. II.  
9. See Peter D. Junger, The Original Plain Meaning of the Right to Bear 
Arms, 63 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 141, 142 (2012) (“Only the 
Humpty Dumpty—sic volo, sic jubeo—school of constitutional analysis 
appears capable of dealing with [the Second Amendment].”). 
10. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:58-2.4, 2C:58-2.5 (2005).  
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question is no. In Part I, this Comment discusses how smart-gun 
technology functions and the controversy surrounding its 
implementation. Part II develops a framework for analyzing the 
constitutionality of the new technology based on jurisprudence and 
the work of Eugene Volokh. Finally, Part III of this Comment applies 
the framework from Part II to the arguments discussed in Part I.  
I. Smart Guns: Concerns, Goals, and Facts  
This Comment will first describe how smart-gun technology works 
and the various debates surrounding its implementation.11 Under-
standing the implications, both positive and negative, of smart guns 
will shed light on their constitutionality, which is discussed in Part 
III. This Comment describes what smart guns are and how they work. 
Next, this Comment discusses arguments concerning the functionality 
of smart guns, whether they actually will result in less gun violence, 
and the cost of implementing a smart-gun regime.  
A. An Overview of Smart-Gun Technology 
A smart gun is a gun that “will only fire when grasped by an 
authorized user.”12 This takes place using a variety of technologies, 
including touch memory, remote control, radio frequency 
identification (“RFID”), and biometric technology.13 The most well 
known of these technologies is RFID technology. This type of smart 
gun requires the user to wear a ring, watch, or bracelet, which 
transmits radio waves to the corresponding gun, allowing it to be 
fired. However, the distance these radio waves can travel requires the 
owner to be holding the gun or similarly situated in proximity for the 
gun to fire.14 In order to power the receiver inside the gun, the RFID 
smart gun requires batteries. A passive transmitter (the ring, bracelet, 
or watch) does not require electricity to function properly.15 It is not 
yet clear if RFID smart guns would be sold on a one-gun-one-
 
11. This discussion will involve some practical information about how the 
technology works in general, but an in-depth discussion is outside the 
scope of this Comment. For more information regarding the technology 
itself, see Sandia National Laboratories, Smart Gun Tech-
nology Project Final Report (1996); Michael J. Ram, Technology 
of Safety Devices for Firearms, 12 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 218 (2000). 
12. Ram, supra note 11, at 222.  
13. Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 120. The German 
Armatix iP1 pistol is one of the best-known smart guns commercially 
available. See Armatix iP1 Pistol, Armatix, http://www.armatix.de/ 
iP1-Pistol.779.0.html?&L=1 (last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
14. See Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 120.  
15.  See id. at 82.  
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transmitter policy, but the technology certainly exists to allow 
multiple transmitters to access the weapon.  
Biometric technology is another popular form of smart-gun 
technology. Typically, biometric technology uses digitally recorded 
behavioral or physiological characteristics of the owner to verify an 
authorized user.16 One common type of biometric technology identifies 
an authorized user through fingerprint recognition, but the technology 
also includes recognition through voice recognition or a personal 
identification number.17 The lock and key function of biometric 
technology tends to be very accurate at recognizing an authorized 
user, but it consumes a concerning amount of power and requires a 
number of seconds in order to identify a user.18 Like RFID, the 
legality of authorizing more than one user is not clear, but the 
possibility exists.  
Regardless of what sort of technology the smart gun uses, the goal 
and the essential function of those technologies are the same. If these 
smart guns are only sold to law-abiding citizens and only fire in the 
hand of the buyer, then chances of the smart gun being used for an 
unlawful purpose or in accidental shootings should be substantially 
lower than for regular guns. 
To some this “unlocking” technology is to firearms as air bags are 
to automobiles.19 Guns that only fire in the hands of authorized users 
greatly mitigate the threat of a person’s own gun being turned against 
her or of accidental shootings in the home.20 To others, smart guns are 
 
16. See id. at 90 (describing the difference between “behavioral” and 
“physiological” characteristics in “identifying” or “verifying” the user’s 
identity).  
17. See id.  
18. See id. at 92–93. 
19. See Michael S. Rosenwald, “We Need the iPhone of Guns”: Will Smart 
Guns Transform the Gun Industry?, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 2014, at A1, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/we-need-the-iphone-
of-guns-will-smart-guns-transform-the-gun-industry/2014/02/17/6ebe76 
da-8f58-11e3-b227-12a45d109e03_story.html (“Electronic chips inside 
the gun and the watch communicate with each other. If the watch is 
within close reach of the gun, a light on the grip turns green. Fire away. 
No watch means no green light. The gun becomes a paperweight.”).  
20. Jonathan Turley, The Smart Gun: Will New Technology Open Up a 
New Wave of Liability Claims Over “Dumb” Guns?, Jonathan Turley 
(Feb. 21, 2014), http://jonathanturley.org/2014/02/21/the-smart-gun-
will-new-technology-open-up-a-new-wave-of-liability-claims-over-dumb-
guns/ (“It is technology that could substantially reduce accidental 
shootings at home as well as cases where officers have their guns taken 
from them in shootings.”). 
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an unnecessary hindrance on the ability to use a gun freely and will 
actually make gun owners less safe.21 
B. The Debate Surrounding Smart Guns 
1. Are Smart Guns Reliable?  
The first, and perhaps largest, concern regarding smart guns is 
whether the technology will inhibit the gun’s functionality because the 
internal processing system of the gun will result in a delay in use. 
This is particularly worrisome to police officers, who use guns in split-
second decisions and need their guns to be ready to fire immediately.22 
Such a delay not only threatens the usability of firearms in the hands 
of officers but also in the hands of anyone who is using the gun for 
self-defense, which also requires quick decision making.23 In one study, 
the Office of Legislative Research to the Connecticut General 
Assembly gave great weight to the concern that “neither biometric or 
RFID systems are instantaneous as it takes time for the controller to 
disengage the safety on the gun.”24 At the same time, the report 
observes that there has yet to be any independent study on the 
reliability of smart guns.25 Thus, it is difficult to gauge the 
appropriate weight to assign to studies about smart guns.  
Thankfully, the technology is not likely be commercially available 
while it presents the risk of the gun not firing when needed.26 The 
United States Department of Justice placed three smart guns in the 
“upper tier” of “production-ready design”: iGun’s M-2000, Armatix’s 
Smart System, which consists of the iP1 pistol and iW1 watch, and 
Kodiak’s Intelligun.27 According to a study by Sandia National 
Laboratories, the speed of RFID smart guns was satisfactory for 
 
21. Joseph Steinberg, Why You Should Be Concerned About the New 
“Smart Guns” (Whether You Love or Hate Guns), Forbes (May 4, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/josephsteinberg/2014/05/04/smart 
guns/. 
22. See Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 50. 
23. See Steinberg, supra note 21.  
24. Kevin McCarthy, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE 
RESEARCH, 2013-R-0036, OLR RESEARCH REPORT: Smart Guns 4 
(2013).  
25. Id.  
26. Cf. Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 117 (observing 
that smart guns’ reliability had not attained the police officers’ ideal 
goals as of 1996).  
27. Mark Greene, National Institute of Justice Research Report, 
A Review of Gun Safety Technologies 28–30 (June 2013) (ranking 
gun technology in tiers based on a scale of 1–9, where receiving a rank 
of 7–9 placed the technology in the “Upper Tier”).  
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police officers as of 1996.28 Eugene Volokh has observed that “if police 
departments are ready to use personalized guns,” then requiring such 
guns is less likely to be regarded as an actual change to the weapon’s 
reliability.29 This argument cuts both ways because while police may 
be ready for the adoption of smart guns, the fact remains that no 
police department in the United States has employed the technology. 
Perhaps this reflects the broader issue that smart guns are not 
currently commercially available in the United States.30 Regardless, 
the reliability of smart guns will remain a major issue until 
independent studies confirm or deny such concerns.  
2. Will Smart Guns Really Keep Guns Out of the Wrong Hands? 
The next important debate about smart guns is whether they 
really will reduce unnecessary gun violence by preventing 
unauthorized use. It is important to note that “[s]mart guns would 
have no impact on firearms already in circulation,”31 which is about 
270,000,000 to 310,000,000 guns in the U.S.32 Thus, there is a strong 
argument that smart guns will have little to no impact on gun 
violence because there are already so many guns available that can be 
fired by anyone for any reason. Moreover, given the high number of 
lawful gun owners in the United States, and the small likelihood that 
a homicide would be “committed by a perpetrator using someone 
else’s gun,” there is no reason to expect a noticeable reduction in 
violence due to smart guns.33 Some purport that suicides would not 
likely be affected by smart guns because most gun suicides take place  
28. See Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 117 (noting 
that for RFID equipped smart guns “speed [was] not a problem” 
although there was a lingering concern was that electromagnetic 
interference could render the gun unusable). 
29. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Self-
Defense, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1492 (2009).  
30. See McCarthy, supra note 24, at 4–5 (observing that, as of 2012, 
smart gun technology “does exist, at least for demonstration purposes, 
[but] it is still not” commercially available in a ‘handgun package’). The 
Armatrix iP1 described above was briefly for sale by the Oak Tree Gun 
Club in California, but the shop has since discontinued sales and denied 
ever carrying the gun, after receiving harsh criticism from gun rights 
advocates. Michael S. Rosenwald, California Store’s Sale of Smart Gun 
Prompts a Furious Backlash, Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 2014, at A2.  
31. Violence Policy Center, “Smart” Guns Backgrounder 1 (2013), 
available at https://www.vpc.org/fact_sht/Smart%20Gun%202013.pdf.  
32. United States—Gun Facts, Figures, and the Law: Gun Numbers, Gun 
Policy.org, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/united-states 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
33. See Violence Policy Center, supra note 31, at 2 (noting that gun 
violence is typically the result of an authorized owner using a gun for an 
illegal purpose).  
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by an “authorized” gun user.34 Regarding deaths of children using 
guns, the NRA has asserted that such statistics are usually 
exaggerated and so there is no real need for smart-gun technology to 
prevent those types of injuries.35 Further, the gun is still likely to fire 
in a struggle where the authorized user and unauthorized user both 
have their hands on the gun.36 Putting all the statistics aside, there is 
the possibility that the computer technology in smart guns could be 
hacked, rendering them usable by anybody.37 
Pro–smart gun pundits have fewer statistics to rely on but can 
still make a forceful argument. “One out of every six police officers 
who is killed in the line of duty is shot with his or her own gun.”38 
Smart guns would likely reduce this number. Additionally, if the 
owner is a parent who does not authorize her children to use the gun, 
the number of children killed or injured by guns would likely drop.39 
However, statistics regarding gun violence and the actual effects of 
increased gun regulation are typically unreliable and almost 
impossible to find.40 Perhaps the best response for the pro–smart gun 
pundit is that keeping guns out of the hands of unauthorized users is 
a good thing by itself and statistics about gun violence are a 
byproduct.41 Given that statistics are not trustworthy, the most 
practical step in reducing gun violence may be to ignore the numbers 
and try to eliminate the cause of the violence and let that be enough. 
To that end, the pro–smart gun pundit has a strong argument 
 
34. Id. (describing an authorized gun user as an individual who owns a gun 
or has access to guns with parental permission).  
35. See Fact Sheet: “Smart” Guns, NRA-ILA (Jan. 27, 2000), 
http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/fact-sheets/2000/smart-guns.aspx 
(remarking that the number of children killed due to gun violence was 
approximately 138 and that “anti-gun groups often grossly exaggerate 
the number of such shootings”).  
36. See Steinberg, supra note 21 (“[T]he ‘watch approach’ would seemingly 
not prevent a criminal from grabbing someone’s weapon and shooting 
him at point black range (as long as the gun was always near the 
watch). . . .”). 
37. Id.  
38. Matthew Pontillo, Suing Gun Manufacturers: A Shot in the Dark, 74 
St. John’s L. Rev. 1167, 1182 (2000). 
39. Approximately 1,500 children die from gun use every year. See Injury 
Research and Policy, Nationwide Children’s, http://www.nationwide 
childrens.org/cirp-gun-safety (last visited Sept. 16, 2014). 
40. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1465 (identifying the inherent problem 
with attempting to predict the consequences of increased gun 
regulation).  
41. See generally Ram, supra note 11, at 221 (observing that in addition to 
preventing unauthorized users from firing them, smart guns “may also 
include means to prevent firing the weapon at certain people”). 
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because there can be little debate over whether a smart gun is the 
most effective means available to restrict gun use to those who are 
authorized to use them.  
3. Expect to Pay a Premium Price 
Finally, pundits disagree on the feasibility of implementing a 
regime making smart guns mandatory because of the technology’s 
cost. This is an understandable concern considering that smart guns 
are likely to cost approximately twice as much as a normal handgun.42 
“[A] possible target for a smart gun technology may be approximately 
10% additional cost in volume production,” although a study showed 
that some police officers would be willing to spend twice as much on a 
reliable smart gun.43 Even those who do not support the idea of 
making smart guns mandatory admit that the technology provides 
peace of mind worth paying for.44 
On the other hand, if there are questions about a smart gun’s 
reliability while the product’s cost doubles that of reliable, normal 
handguns, there is no sense in forcing the consumer to buy such a 
product.45 In fact, “[g]un-store owners say there is no market for such 
guns and that they have never had a single customer inquiry.”46 It 
seems unfair to require the public to buy smart guns, especially when 
the technology is so expensive that even government agencies could 
 
42. Compare Domestic MSRP Price List 2014, Colt (Jan. 1, 2014), 
available at http://www.colt.com/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/ 
Download.aspx?EntryId=846&PortalId=0&DownloadMethod=attachme
nt (pricing various models of the Colt .45 ACP at approximately 
$1,000), with Awr Hawkins, Armatix Ip1 “Smart Gun” Only Chambered 
In .22lr, Costs $1,800, Breitbart (May 4, 2014), 
http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/05/04/Much-Touted-
Smart-Gun-Only-Chambered-In-22-LR-Costs-1-800.  
43. See Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 40–41 
(discussing various issues associated with the cost of smart guns).  
44. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Smart Guns, Electromagnetic Pulse, and 
Planning for Unknown-Probability Dangers, The Volokh Conspiracy 
(May 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir 
acy/wp/2014/05/23/smart-guns-electromagnetic-pulse-and-planning-for-
unknown-probability-dangers/ (“If I had a child, and smart guns were 
reliable enough, I might well be willing to spend some extra money to 
get a smart gun instead of my current gun.”). 
45. Cf. Eugene Volokh, “Smart Guns,” THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 22, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/ 
2014/05/22/smart-guns-2/ (observing that “we can see that it’s doable, 
we can expect that it will at one point make it big, inventors and 
manufacturers have lots of incentive to make it work—but it takes time 
for it to develop to the point that it works for consumers”).  
46. Pokin, supra note 1.  
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not likely afford it.47 Between the questionable reliability and the lack 
of demand for smart guns, the price will not likely drop anytime soon.  
II. Second Amendment Jurisprudence and 
an Analytical Framework  
A. District of Columbia v. Heller 
District of Columbia v. Heller48 is the seminal U.S. Supreme Court 
case addressing the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment. 
An understanding of what rights are protected under Heller is 
essential to moving forward with an analysis on the constitutionality 
of current or future gun laws. At the same time, much of the analysis 
in Heller has little bearing on the scope of this Comment and will not 
be discussed.  
The suit in Heller arose when Dick Heller applied for a license to 
own a handgun in his home in the District of Columbia.49 Essentially, 
the District of Columbia regulated gun ownership in two steps. First, 
D.C. CODE § 7-2502 did not permit a person to own a handgun 
without a certificate from the chief of police.50 Second, D.C. CODE  
§ 7-2502 required that a handgun, present lawfully in the owner’s 
home, be maintained “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a 
trigger lock or similar device.”51 Pursuant to this law, the District of 
Columbia refused to issue such a license to Heller.52 Heller then filed 
suit to enjoin the District of Columbia from enforcing the law.53  
 
47. SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, supra note 11, at 40 (observing that 
police departments function on a minimal budget and will not be able to 
afford smart guns).  
48. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
49. Id. at 575.  
50. Id. (citing D.C. Code §§ 22-4504(a) and 22-4506 (2001)). 
51. Id. (quoting D.C. Code § 7-2502.02 (2001)). 
52. See id. at 574–75 (describing the restrictions on handgun ownership 
imposed by D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01–2502.02 (2001), which prevented 
the ownership of a handgun without a certificate issued by the Chief of 
Police, and in the event that a person did own a handgun in her home, 
the handgun was required to be effectively unusable). See generally 
D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01–2502.02 (2001) (detailing the circumstances 
under which ownership of a handgun is legal).  
53. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 575–76 (“He thereafter filed a lawsuit in the 
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, on Second 
Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on the 
registration of handguns, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits 
the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and the trigger-
lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of ‘functional firearms 
within the home.’”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
A Higher Caliber of Regulation 
260 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the District of 
Columbia law.54 The crux of the majority opinion is that the federal 
government may not restrict an individual’s right to self-defense, as 
protected in the Second Amendment, by prohibiting the possession of 
an operable handgun in the home.55 This Comment discusses how 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, arrived at that conclusion 
using an originalism analysis that bifurcated the scope of the Second 
Amendment. After discerning the scope, Justice Scalia determined 
that the District of Columbia law infringed upon the right to keep 
and bear arms. But the Supreme Court concluded that the District of 
Columbia law infringed on those rights, not because the law failed a 
constitutional standard of review but rather because prohibitions of 
the type embodied in the District of Columbia law could be assumed 
to offend Second Amendment rights under any analysis.  
1. The Scope of the Second Amendment Under Heller 
Justice Scalia began by separating the text of the Second 
Amendment into the “prefatory clause” and the “operative clause.”56 
His analysis of the operative clause started by determining to what 
group of people the Second Amendment refers in “the right of the 
people.”57 Through examining the term “right of the people” as used 
elsewhere in the Constitution, Scalia established that the starting 
point for his analysis was “a strong presumption that the Second 
Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all 
Americans,” not just those Americans serving in some sort of militia.58 
 
54. Id. at 570–72, 635.  
55. See id. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun 
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its 
prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable 
for the purpose of immediate self-defense. Assuming that Heller is not 
disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District 
must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him a license to 
carry it in the home.”). 
56. Id. at 577.  
57. See id. at 579 (discussing the term “right of the people” as used in the 
Second Amendment).  
58. Id. at 581. Stevens rigorously disagreed with this analysis in his dissent. 
See id. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens’s dissenting opinion is 
due, in large part, to a disagreement about whether the Second 
Amendment protects a collective right or an individual right. While 
Justice Stevens admits that the Second Amendment protects a right 
that “can be enforced by individuals” his evaluation of the scope of that 
right conforms to the collective-right school of thought. Id. at 636. For 
an excellent discussion on the “collective right theory,” see Roger I. 
Roots, The Approaching Death of the Collective Right Theory of the 
Second Amendment, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 71, 73–83 (2000) (discussing how 
the collective right theory has fallen out of favor).  
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The majority went on to say that the meaning of “to keep and bear 
arms” does not limit the type of weapons protected under the Second 
Amendment to weapons in “military use.”59 After discerning that the 
right is unconnected with military service, Justice Scalia determined 
that the essential purpose of the right codified in the Second 
Amendment was individual self-defense.60 The Second Amendment did 
not create this right to self-defense; it is innate.61 Thus, the purpose of 
the Second Amendment was only to enshrine it.62  
Heller next explained the meaning of the prefatory clause of the 
Second Amendment. First, the prefatory clause’s use of the term 
“well-regulated militia” did not limit the amendment’s application to 
those with some connection to formal military service.63 When the 
Framers drafted the Second Amendment, a standing army was a 
subsection of able-bodied men who were part of a “militia” and not 
the other way around.64 Second, the Second Amendment secures a free 
state through the preservation of a militia by (1) enabling all people 
to “repel[] invasions and suppress[] insurrections,” (2) “render[ing] 
large standing armies unnecessary,” and (3) enabling the people to 
better “resist tyranny.”65 While this interpretation may, at first, seem 
to tie the Second Amendment to service in some sort of militia, 
Justice Scalia determined that the prefatory clause kept the individual 
right to bear arms intact. The prefatory clause serves to prevent the 
government from eradicating a militia.66 
2. Lawful Regulations and Impermissible Violations 
of Second Amendment Rights 
The Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment entirely 
abrogated the District of Columbia law,67 and in slamming the door 
 
59. Heller, 554 U.S. at 589.  
60. Id. at 592.  
61. Id.  
62. Id.  
63. See id. at 595 (reiterating the definition of this term as espoused in 
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).  
64. Id. at 596.  
65. See id. at 597–98 (listing the purpose for which the Framers included 
the term “security of a free state”). The purpose of the prefatory clause 
is to “prevent the elimination of the militia”; thus, the Second 
Amendment does have some connection to organized armed service. Id. 
at 599. However, the strength of that connection is not within the scope 
of this Comment.  
66. Id. at 599.  
67. See id. at 635 (ruling that the District of Columbia’s ban on keeping a 
usable firearm in one’s home violated the Second Amendment).  
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on that law, Justice Scalia set two important precedents. First, 
Justice Scalia admitted that the Second Amendment does not protect 
the right of gun possession for all people and does not protect gun 
possession for any purpose.68 Second, the majority did not use a 
“standard of review” analysis to strike down the District of Columbia 
law but found the law infringed on rights on a categorical basis.  
Although Heller’s majority was protective of Second Amendment 
rights, it acknowledged that those rights are not unlimited.69 This was 
not a revelation discovered in Heller but rather an observation that in 
the Second Amendment’s history there are “longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . [and] laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
firearms.”70 In fact, Justice Scalia recognized that this was not an 
exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful” regulations of the right to 
bears arms.71 
At the same time, the majority did not give much guidance to 
courts discerning when a regulation is “presumptively lawful” or when 
it impermissibly infringes upon Second Amendment rights. Typically, 
when a constitutional right is at issue in a case, the Supreme Court 
undertakes a “standard of review” analysis to determine if a law 
impermissibly burdens those constitutional rights.72 In Heller, Justice 
Scalia did not establish what standard of review applies to laws that 
are alleged to infringe on Second Amendment rights; in fact, he 
acknowledged that the Court was deliberately avoiding the issue.73 
However, the majority did give two guideposts for future courts 
presented with similar issues. First, rational basis is likely not the 
appropriate standard of review when analyzing laws that regulate 
rights within the scope of the Second Amendment because rational  
68. Id. at 595.  
69. Id. at 626. 
70. Id. at 626–27.  
71. Id. at 627 n.26, 628 n.27.  
72. See David Chang, Structuring Constitutional Doctrine: Principles, 
Proof, and the Functions of Judicial Review, 58 Rutgers L. Rev. 777, 
779–80 (2006) (describing the types of scrutiny that typically apply to 
corresponding constitutional rights). See also Jason T. Anderson, 
Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left 
Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 547, 
567 (2009) (explaining that it “makes sense to start with a discussion of 
fundamental rights, as the Court has actually provided some guidelines 
for how to determine if a right is fundamental. Strict scrutiny is 
generally thought to apply to ‘any governmental actions which limit the 
exercise of ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights”). 
73. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (observing Justice Breyer’s criticism for 
not announcing a standard of review).  
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basis would not do justice to the “substance of a constitutional 
guarantee.”74 Second, Justice Scalia expressed why no standard of 
review was needed:  
Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to 
enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home “the 
most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for 
protection of one’s home and family,” would fail constitutional 
muster.75 
Scalia believed that the District of Columbia law so obviously 
infringed on Second Amendment rights that the Court needed no 
analysis to deem it unconstitutional. In other words, the Supreme 
Court determined that the kind of regulations at issue in Heller were 
categorically unjustifiable violations of Second Amendment rights.76 
Moreover, the majority specifically barred an analysis of the Second 
Amendment rights that balanced the burden on protected interests as 
compared with the “statute’s salutary effect upon important 
government interest.”77 Such a strong position disfavoring regulation 
of Second Amendment rights is arguably harsher than strict scrutiny 
because it does not inquire into the purpose or tailoring of the law. 
Thus, it seems Heller did not give much hope for those in favor of gun 
control.  
In summary, an inquiry on whether a particular gun law is 
constitutional under Heller should proceed by asking whether the 
regulation infringes on the scope of the Second Amendment according 
to the prefatory or operative clauses. If a law does impede the exercise 
of the right to bear arms in the way described in Heller, the court 
conducts no analysis, and the law is struck down. At the same time, 
certain regulations are almost categorically permissible, or 
“presumptively lawful.” While this inquiry is illuminating, it is far 
 
74. Id. (“Justice Breyer correctly notes that this law, like almost all laws, 
would pass rational-basis scrutiny. But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode 
of analysis we have used when evaluating laws under constitutional 
commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. . . . In 
those cases, ‘rational basis’ is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the 
very substance of the constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the same test 
could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may 
regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the 
guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to 
keep and bear arms.”) (citations omitted).  
75. Id. at 628–29.  
76. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010); Anderson, supra 
note 72, at 578 (discussing categorical violations of Second Amendment 
rights analogized to categorical violations of First Amendment rights).  
77. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.  
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from exhaustive because it does not deliver “a coherent method with 
which to evaluate Second Amendment restrictions.”78 In particular, 
Heller did not establish the scope of the Second Amendment’s right to 
bear arms or what level of scrutiny applies to laws burdening the 
right to bear arms.79 Consequently, the development of a Second 
Amendment analysis has been left to lower courts and scholars.80  
B.  Post-Heller Courts and Eugene Volokh’s Framework 
Since the landmark decision in Heller, federal courts have 
struggled to articulate an analysis for gun regulations that 
purportedly violate the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms. In order to determine the constitutionality of laws mandating 
that guns be equipped with smart-gun technology, this Comment 
must lay out a practical analysis. Thus, this Comment first discusses 
why adopting the Second Amendment claims framework discussed by 
Eugene Volokh agrees with Second Amendment rights and 
jurisprudence.81 Second, this Comment will address the “how” 
restriction described by Volokh by looking at Jackson v. City and 
County of San Francisco.82 Next, this Comment discusses how federal 
courts have dealt with “who” restrictions by reviewing cases from 
circuit courts. Finally, this Comment discusses how the Second 
Circuit handled what Volokh describes as an “expenses” restriction. 
The result is that no constitutional objection to smart-gun laws would 
likely succeed, using the analysis trending in federal courts.  
1. Restrictions on “How,” “Who,” and “Expenses” 
According to Volokh 
Predominantly, federal courts cite the lack of guidance regarding 
what standard of review applies to right-to-bear-arms claims as the 
 
78. Jeff Golimowski, Pulling the Trigger: Evaluating Criminal Gun Laws in 
a Post-Heller World, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1599, 1600 (2012).  
79. See Anderson, supra note 72, at 547–48 (“But the Court left the door 
open for a new debate to begin in the Second Amendment context: what 
standard of review applies to legislation that restricts an individual’s 
right to bear arms?”). 
80. See Andrew Peace, A Snowball’s Chance in Heller: Why Decastro’s 
Substantial Burden Standard Is Unlikely to Survive, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 
175, 180 (2013), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/ 
vol54/iss6/14 (“Since the Supreme Court handed down Heller, courts 
have struggled with what standard to use when evaluating Second 
Amendment challenges.”). 
81. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1446 (“I sometimes offer my views on how 
particular gun-rights controversies should be resolved, but more often I 
just suggest a structure for analyzing those controversies.”). 
82. 746 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2014).  
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biggest problem when analyzing those claims.83 But as Eugene Volokh 
points out, the bigger issue is that federal courts have not recognized 
“different categories of justification for a restriction on the right to 
bear arms.”84 These categories of regulations mirror those recognized 
in First Amendment right cases and should apply in Second 
Amendment cases for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court 
recognized that traditional limitations on the right to bear arms were 
similar to the limitations recognized in First Amendment free speech 
cases in Heller.85 Second, it makes sense to differentiate between 
restrictions that directly concern a constitutional right and other 
measures that appear to do so by regulating a certain right but that 
upon further investigation are outside that right’s scope.86 Volokh 
developed a framework based on these ideas. In that framework, 
different types of restrictions fit into different categories, and the 
different categories invoke corresponding standards of review.87 By 
identifying the type of gun regulation, a court is more apt to apply a 
standard of review that is appropriate considering how the regulation 
affects the rights at issue, directly or tangentially.88 
Volokh discusses three categories of restrictions that are relevant 
to this Comment’s analysis. First, Volokh describes some gun 
regulations as “how” restrictions.89 This type of restriction tends to 
place requirements on how guns are to be stored: loaded or unloaded, 
using trigger locks, keeping the gun disassembled, etc.90 This type of 
restriction was contemplated by the Court in Heller, where the 
District of Columbia law prohibited keeping a gun in the home if the 
gun was not unloaded or disassembled.91 According to Volokh, self-
 
83. See, e.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).  
84. Volokh, supra note 29, at 1446.  
85. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). See also Ezell 
v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010).  
86. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1449 (“Sometimes a constitutional right 
isn’t violated by a restriction because the restriction is outside the terms 
of the right as set forth by the constitution. The restriction may still 
implicate some of the central concerns that prompted the recognition of 
the right, but the constitutional text, the original meaning, or our 
understanding of background constitutional norms may lead us to 
conclude that the right is narrower than its purposes may suggest.”). 
87. Id. at 1446.  
88. Id. at 1447. 
89. Id. at 1534.  
90. Id.  
91. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008) 
(describing the restrictions on handgun ownership imposed by D.C. 
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defense requires a gun to be ready at a moment’s notice, so these 
types of burdens are typically subject to strict scrutiny for placing a 
substantial burden on Second Amendment rights.92 
The next type of restriction is a “who” restriction, which bans 
certain classes of people from possessing a firearm.93 In Heller, the 
Court recognized this type of restriction as “presumptively lawful” 
and observed that such prohibitions had been in place since the 
inception of the Second Amendment.94 Generally, these types of laws 
place restrictions on gun ownership for those who have been convicted 
of certain crimes, who are under a certain age, or who have a mental 
disability.95 Volokh contends that such restrictions should receive 
strict scrutiny because while they may be justifiable, they are 
imposing a substantial burden on an entire class’s Second Amendment 
rights.96 This seems to go against the Supreme Court’s determination 
in Heller that such restrictions are “presumptively lawful,” so the 
level of scrutiny that applies to these restrictions is unclear.97 
The last type of restriction relevant to this discussion are the 
expenses attached to gun ownership. These sorts of restrictions show 
up in a number of ways: high taxes, raising the price of the gun, or 
fees on permits.98 The burden this imposes on gun ownership is 
variable and may shift depending on the purpose of the fee and the 
additional amount that the individual must pay.99 However, if the 
government were to “materially raise” the “price of guns and 
ammunition, or bans on inexpensive firearms,” then the regulation 
would constitute a “substantial burden” demanding strict scrutiny.100 
Put another way, the government may hike up prices on gun 
ownership, but when the prices become a deterrent to owning a gun, 
 
Code §§ 7-2501.01–2502.02 (2001), which prevented the ownership of a 
handgun without rendering the handgun effectively unusable). See 
generally D.C. Code §§ 7-2501.01–2502.02 (2001) (detailing the circum-
stances under which ownership of a handgun is legal). 
92. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1534 n.380 (discussing Heller and observ-
ing that such laws “substantially burden” the right to bear arms).  
93. Id. at 1493.  
94. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.  
95. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1498–1515 (discussing the various classes 
of individuals who cannot own a gun lawfully).  
96. Id. at 1496–97.  
97. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. This issue is addressed in detail infra Part 
II.B.2.  
98. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1542–43 (discussing how increasing the 
cost of owning a firearm may burden Second Amendment rights).  
99. See id. at 1542–43.  
100. Id. at 1542. 
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the measure is presumptively unconstitutional. Volokh compares such 
measures to imposing a 24-hour waiting period for women seeking 
abortions; the measure is permissible until it deters exercising the 
right instead of regulating certain aspects of exercising that right.101  
2. Volokh’s Categories in Circuit Courts 
Although circuit courts do not seem to be aware of it, they have 
developed and applied their own versions of Volokh’s analysis as a 
way to deal with the gaps in Heller’s analysis. The result has been 
that most gun regulations are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny or 
something lower, even if doing so required the court to veer from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Heller. The most noticeable example of 
federal courts creating an analysis for Second Amendment claims is 
seen in “who” restrictions. Next, this Comment discusses the Ninth 
Circuit’s handling of a “how” restriction. Finally, this Comment looks 
at the Second Circuit’s ruling regarding “expenses” restrictions.  
a. Bans Resulting from Domestic Misdemeanors as a “Who” 
Restriction 
United States v. Chovan102 is one of many circuit court cases to 
rule on the constitutionality of provisions contained in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922.103 The particular provision at issue in the case prohibited a 
person from possessing or owning a firearm if that person had “been 
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence.”104 Because it bans a class of people from owning a firearm, 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is an ideal example of a “who” restriction. It 
also has been a prolific topic of litigation concerning Second 
Amendment rights since Heller.105 Consequently, analysis regarding 
this provision has become very popular in addressing “who” restric-
tions.  
 
101. See id. at 1544 (describing how waiting periods for abortions are 
constitutional as long as they are not a “substantial obstacle” to getting 
an abortion).  
102. 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).  
103. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012) is titled “Unlawful Acts” and places statutory 
restraints on gun ownership, sale, possession, purchase, and various 
other aspects of gun regulation.  
104. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012).  
105. See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 
614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12 (1st 
Cir. 2011). See also United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
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Based on circuit court cases applying the test announced in 
United States v. Marzzarella,106 Chovan conducted the increasingly 
popular two-part inquiry to discern whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) 
violated the Second Amendment.107 In the first part of the analysis, 
the Ninth Circuit asked “whether the challenged law burden[ed] 
conduct protected by the Second Amendment.”108 Historical evidence 
indicated that gun bans for felons did not exist before World War I, 
and at that, there is no deep history in the United States of 
misdemeanor convictions acting as a bar to gun ownership.109 The 
court acknowledged that this regulation was similar to gun bans for 
convicted felons, which the Supreme Court recognized as presump-
tively lawful but did not categorically exclude them from review; they 
can still be unconstitutional in effect.110 The court was therefore 
persuaded that Chovan had a right to a gun for the purpose of self-
defense, and, therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) touched on Second 
Amendment rights.111 
The court then asked what level of scrutiny should apply to 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).112 This analysis was based on two queries: “(1) 
 
106. 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). In Marzzarella, the defendant challenged 
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2006) by purchasing a gun 
with an “obliterated serial number.” Id. at 87. The Third Circuit 
determined that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because the 
regulation at issue was one of the “presumptively lawful” and 
“longstanding limitations [that] are exceptions to the right to bear 
arms” announced in Heller. Id. at 91 (citing District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008)). Accordingly, the court found that 
18 U.S.C. § 922(k) did burden Second Amendment rights, but that 
burden was de minimis, so the law passed constitutional muster. Id. at 
94, 97, 99. The Court recognized that it was sailing into uncharted 
waters and so, as a precaution, also conducted a strict-scrutiny analysis 
and still found that 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) was constitutional. Id. at 99. The 
court likely did so knowing that its analysis was based on how it 
perceived Second Amendment rights, not a prior determination by the 
Supreme Court or other authoritative law. See Anderson, supra note 72, 
at 556 (“[T]he use of different standards of review reflects and 
implements a hierarchy of constitutional values, and that the choice of a 
particular standard of review reflects the Court’s value determination of 
the right at issue as compared to other constitutionally protected 
rights.”). 
107. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1134–36 (reviewing the cases that have applied 
Marzzarella’s two-part inquiry). See also White, 593 F.3d at 1205; 
Chester, 628 F.3d at 680; Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641.  
108. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136.  
109. See id. at 1137.  
110. See id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1136.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
A Higher Caliber of Regulation 
269 
how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right, 
and (2) the severity of the law’s burden on the right.”113 To discern 
how close the law was to the right to bear arms, the Ninth Circuit 
looked to Heller, which gave the scope of Second Amendment 
rights.114 The court found that the law at issue did not burden a 
“core” Second Amendment right because those “core” rights only 
apply to “law-abiding responsible citizens”—not to domestic violence 
convicts.115 But the court did find that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) 
substantially burdened some other Second Amendment rights by 
functioning as a lifetime ban on gun ownership.116 The court 
determined that the lack of infringement on “core” rights with the 
“substantial burden” on others demanded that the court apply 
intermediate scrutiny.117 
In applying intermediate scrutiny, the court found that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(9)’s “prohibition on gun possession by domestic violence 
misdemeanants [was] substantially related to the important 
government interest of preventing domestic gun violence.”118 Thus, it 
passed intermediate scrutiny, and Chovan was banned from owning a 
gun for life.  
b. Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, and the “How” 
Restriction.  
In Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco,119 the Ninth 
Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of a San Francisco law 
requiring guns stored in the home to be “stored in a locked container 
or disabled with a trigger lock that has been approved by the 
California Department of Justice.”120 This was the most exemplary 
case of a “how” restriction since McDonald v. Chicago.121 Using the 
 
113. Id. at 1138 (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th 
Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
114. Id.  
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id.  
118. See id. at 1140–41 (“We hold that the government has thereby met its 
burden to show that § 922(g)(9)’s prohibition on gun possession by 
domestic violence misdemeanants is substantially related to the 
important government interest of preventing domestic gun violence.”). 
See also United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642–44 (7th Cir. 2010). 
119. Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 
2014).  
120. Id. at 958 (quoting San Francisco, Cal., Police Code § 4512 
(2013)).  
121. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). McDonald is the most notable Supreme Court 
case to discuss Second Amendment rights since Heller. But while the 
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same analysis that applied in Chovan and other “who” restriction 
cases, the court upheld the San Francisco ordinance using 
intermediate scrutiny.122  
In the first part of the court’s analysis, the Ninth Circuit asked 
“whether the challenged law burden[ed] conduct protected by the 
Second Amendment.”123 The court answered that question by 
engaging in a discussion of firearm regulations that have been upheld 
as constitutional.124 The Ninth Circuit could not find that the law 
resembled any presumptively lawful regulation, “because it applie[d] 
to law-abiding citizens, and impose[d] restrictions on the use of 
handguns within the home.”125 Thus, the San Francisco Police Code 
§ 4512 was within the scope of rights protected in the Second 
Amendment. 
Next the court determined what level of scrutiny was 
appropriate.126 This analysis consisted of the same two parts as in 
Chovan: (1) how close is the law to Second Amendment rights and (2) 
with what severity does the law burden that right.127 Heller demanded 
the court consider the San Francisco law a “core” burden on the 
Second Amendment because keeping a gun stored in a locked 
container or disabled with a trigger lock makes it more difficult for 
the owner to use the gun in self-defense.128 However, this mandate on 
 
Second Amendment may have taken center stage in the Court’s analysis 
in McDonald, it did not have the lead role. The facts of McDonald are 
similar to Heller but with one key difference: the law at issue in 
McDonald was a city ordinance effectively “banning hand gun possession 
by almost all private citizens” instead of a federal law. Id. at 3026. 
Thus, McDonald was a case that dealt primarily with the incorporation 
of Second Amendment Rights—not with whether the manner in which 
the Chicago ordinance regulated gun possession was constitutional. Id. 
at 3036. See also Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights 
after McDonald v. Chicago, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 159, 177–80 
(2012) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision to incorporate the 
Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment). Discussing 
McDonald would be outside the scope of this Comment because its only 
relevance to this discussion is that it affirmed Heller. See McDonald, 130 
S. Ct. at 3036.  
122. Jackson, 746 F.3d at 958, 961.  
123. Id. at 960 (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d 
Cir. 2010)).  
124. Id. at 962–63.  
125. Id. at 963. 
126. Id. at 960 (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89).  
127. Id. at 963 (citing United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137) (9th 
Cir. 2013)). 
128. Id. at 964 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 
(2008)). 
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a gun’s storage did not directly burden Second Amendment core 
rights but instead 
indirectly burden[ed] the ability to use a handgun, because it 
require[d] retrieving a weapon from a locked safe or removing a 
trigger lock. But because it burdens only the “manner in which 
persons may exercise their Second Amendment rights,” the 
regulation more closely resembles a content-neutral speech 
restriction that regulates only the time, place, or manner of 
speech. The record indicates that a modern gun safe may be 
opened quickly.129 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to San 
Francisco Police Code § 4512.130 
Under intermediate scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit applied a two-
prong analysis that inquired whether the government interest in 
imposing the law was “substantial or important.”131 The court 
accepted that San Francisco had a significant interest in preventing 
accidental gun use against family and friends, suicides, and in 
restricting children’s access to guns.132 The next part of the inquiry 
involved whether the law was sufficiently tailored to the government 
interest.133 The law accomplished its goals by preventing accidental 
gun violence within the home because it restricted access to guns from 
children and could prevent suicides.134 Although, if the gun was 
needed for self-defense, the trigger lock or safe would restrict access to 
the gun by only a “few seconds.” Thus, this burden did not persuade 
the court that the law was not sufficiently tailored,135 and the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the San Francisco Police Code § 4512.136  
c. Kwong v. Bloomberg and “Fee Jurisprudence” 
The last case that illuminates the constitutionality of smart guns 
is the Second Circuit’s decision in Kwong v. Bloomberg.137 At issue in 
 
129. Id. (internal citation omitted). This analysis is dubious considering that 
in Heller the Supreme Court seemed to categorically strike down the 
District of Columbia law’s mandate to keep a gun locked by a trigger or 
disassembled and unloaded. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
130. Jackson v. San Francisco, 746 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 2014).  
131. Id. at 965.  
132. See id. at 965–66.  
133. Id. at 966.  
134. See id.  
135. Id.  
136. Id.  
137. 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2696 (2014).  
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Kwong was a New York City administrative law that set the licensing 
fee for owning a gun in New York City at $340.138 Shui Kwong, the 
Second Amendment Foundation, and the New York State Rifle and 
Pistol Association claimed that a $340 licensing fee placed too great a 
burden on Second Amendment rights and could not pass 
constitutional scrutiny.139 The Second Circuit disagreed.140  
The court in Kwong considered the licensing fee under “fee 
jurisprudence,” which is typically used in assessing the constitu-
tionality of fees government entities charge for “expressive activities 
protected by the First Amendment.”141 The permissibility of such a 
fee is based on the extent to which it offsets the cost of regulating the 
protected activity.142 New York City would incur costs of $343.49 for 
each gun license application it received, and thus the licensing fee was 
permissible because it did not exceed that cost.143 Since the fee was 
not a substantial burden, the Second Circuit applied a level of 
scrutiny that would allow a “marginal, incremental or even 
appreciable restraint” on Second Amendment rights.144 The court 
noted that “the fact that the licensing regime makes the exercise of 
one’s Second Amendment rights more expensive does not necessarily 
mean that it ‘substantially burdens’ that right.”145 In dicta, the 
Second Circuit went as far as to say that the New York City law 
would pass intermediate scrutiny if the court chose to apply it.146 
However, the court in Kwong did not apply intermediate scrutiny. 
The court found that a fee did not actually impose a burden “on the 
 
138. Kwong, 732 F.3d at 161. See generally N.Y.C. Admin Code § 10-
131(a)(3) (2013) (“Every applicant to whom a license has been issued by 
any person other than the police commissioner, except as provided in 
paragraph five of this subdivision, for a special permit from the 
commissioner granting it validity within the city of New York, shall pay 
for such permit a fee of three hundred forty dollars, for each renewal a 
fee of three hundred forty dollars, for each replacement of a lost permit 
a fee of ten dollars.”). 
139. Kwong, 732 F.3d at 165.  
140.  Id.  
141. Id.  
142. See id. (“Put another way, imposing fees on the exercise of 
constitutional rights is permissible when the fees are designed to defray 
(and do not exceed) the administrative costs of regulating the protected 
activity.”).  
143. Id. at 166.  
144. Id. at 167.  
145. Id. at 167–68.  
146. See id. at 168 (observing that New York City has a substantial interest 
in reducing gun violence, and recovering costs associated with licensing 
guns would allow the city to promote that agenda).  
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exercise of constitutional rights” as long as the cost functioned to 
“defray” without exceeding the cost of regulating Second Amendment 
rights.147 
III. Applying the Analysis to Smart-Gun Technology 
This Comment’s review and critique of Second Amendment 
scholarship hardly does justice to the wealth of knowledge available. 
While this Comment has discussed various tests that have been 
applied to laws touching on Second Amendment rights, it makes no 
suggestion on which is correct. Rather, it only applies the various 
tests to what facts are available regarding smart guns in order to 
determine whether there is currently a constitutional basis upon 
which to make an objection to a law mandating the implementation 
of smart-gun technology. The relevant restrictions are “how” 
restrictions, “who” restrictions, and “expense” restrictions.148 
A. A “How” Restriction  
The “how” restriction was at the center of the opinions in Heller 
and Jackson because how the guns were stored slowed access to the 
guns in cases of immediate self-defense.149 Similarly, the main concerns 
discussed previously in Part I.B.1 are whether smart guns will be 
reliable and fire immediately when needed. To determine this issue, 
this Comment has discussed how those concerns fit within the 
analysis of Heller and Jackson, respectively.150 Applying these  
147. Id. at 165.  
148. Requiring that only smart guns be sold may raise additional concerns as 
a “what” restriction, by effectively banning the use of all guns not 
outfitted with smart-gun technology. See generally Volokh, supra note 
29, at 1475 (describing a “what” restriction on bans of categories of 
weapons). This concern is quickly addressed if all guns available to 
consumers would become available as smart guns because these guns 
would not be banned, just modified. To that extent, the modification of 
these weapons becomes the central concern of a “what” restriction 
analysis: the analysis focuses on “[w]hether these requirements 
are . . . more expensive, slower to fire, or unreliable.” Id. at 1491. Thus, 
the issues for a “what” restriction depend on the other restrictions 
discussed in this Comment. In any case, if a smart gun is “highly 
reliable, and the batteries are extremely long lived . . . , or the gun is 
designed so that, if the electronics fail, the gun is left operational as a 
mechanical weapon . . . . Then the requirement probably wouldn’t be a 
substantial burden, and should be upheld.” Id. at 1491–92.  
149. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 686 (2008). See also 
Jackson v. San Francisco, 746 F.3d 954, 961–63 (9th Cir. 2014). 
150. An additional question is what would happen if a court reasoned that 
neither standard was correct and applied strict scrutiny. However, such 
an analysis is outside the scope of this Comment because this Comment 
only applies the law as it exists within the circuit courts.  
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analyses, it seems that concerns regarding smart guns’ readiness in 
emergencies do not rise to the level of a burden on a core Second 
Amendment right.  
While Heller did not establish an analysis for what the Comment 
recognizes as a “how” restriction, the Supreme Court struck down the 
provisions of the District of Columbia law that delayed access to a 
firearm categorically.151 This means that if smart guns cause delay in 
firing the weapon in self-defense, any law restricting ownership solely 
to smart guns would be unconstitutional. On the other hand, if smart 
guns do not delay an individual’s ability to immediately react, there is 
no constitutional issue. The problem with determining this issue now 
is that there are not enough studies on smart guns to know what their 
average activation time tends to be. At best, information from a 
police test of smart guns revealed that RFID smart guns have no 
issue with speed.152 Moreover, a good indicator of the readiness and 
reliability of smart guns is police use—as they are more likely to rely 
on them more frequently than other people.153  
However, the technology is not yet instantaneous, meaning a gun 
may not be ready to fire at the moment the user lays her hand on 
it.154 It is important to note that there is a difference between this sort 
of delay and the delay as contemplated in Heller. To disengage a 
trigger lock, a gun owner needs to enter a combination or use a key. 
Putting a dissembled gun back together would present a similar 
problem. Both of these involve a physical act the user must perform 
before handling the gun. Conversely, RFID technology requires no 
action separate from picking up the firearm. Thus, any delay in the 
readiness of the firearm stemming from the smart gun identifying the 
user is likely to be less than the delay caused by the measures at issue 
in Heller; therefore, the burden may be negligible compared to the 
restriction in Heller. Given a minimal yet not “instantaneous” period 
between when a smart gun is touched and when it is ready to fire, 
and the fact that RFID smart guns already possess “top tier” 
 
151. See Heller, 554 U.S at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on 
handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as 
does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home 
operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”) (emphasis added); 
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010); Anderson, supra 
note 72, at 578 (discussing categorical violations of Second Amendment 
rights analogized to categorical violations of First Amendment rights). 
152. Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 117 (“Speed is not 
a problem, nor is signal integrity since electronics containing error 
checking codes can check if a valid transmission was received and if not 
try again.”).  
153. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1492.  
154. See McCarthy, supra note 24, at 4. 
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technology,155 RFID smart guns would likely pass muster under 
Heller’s categorical exclusion.  
If a court were to apply the “how” analysis used in Jackson, it 
would likely also decide that a smart-gun mandate passes muster 
because the burden imposed by smart guns is minimal. First, a court 
would consider whether a smart gun affects a right within the scope 
of the Second Amendment. Part of the Second Amendment’s scope, as 
described in Heller, is using a gun for the purpose of immediate self-
defense.156 Under Jackson, this would trigger intermediate scrutiny.157 
Also, as in Jackson, this burden would touch on a “core” Second 
Amendment right because the smart gun would inhibit the owner’s 
exercise of self-defense by preventing the owner from immediately 
firing.158 But the burden would be slight; easily under the “few 
seconds” threshold established in Jackson.159 Further, smart guns 
would effectively serve the “important and substantial” government 
purpose of preventing accidental injury to children playing with a 
smart gun.160 Finally, a court would likely consider smart guns 
narrowly tailored to serve the government interest because they are 
less restrictive and less burdensome than placing a trigger lock on a 
gun or locking the gun in a safe as upheld in Jackson.161 Thus, a 
federal court would likely find that a smart-gun mandate would 
survive intermediate scrutiny.  
B. A “Who” Restriction 
The essential function of a smart gun is to prevent an entire class 
of people—those not authorized to use it—from using the gun. As 
noted in Chovan, banning an entire class of people from using a 
firearm implicates Second Amendment rights.162 However, while the 
smart gun functions to prevent those who do not have a right to 
possess a firearm from doing so, smart guns themselves are not 
responsible for preventing anyone from owning a gun. Rather, smart 
guns can be viewed as a practical means of enforcing “who” 
restrictions already in place. At the same time, there may be 
 
155. See Greene, supra note 27, at 29–30.  
156. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on 
handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as 
does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home 
operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”). 
157. See Jackson v. San Francisco, 746 F.3d 954, 964 (9th Cir. 2014).  
158. See id.  
159. Id. at 966. 
160. Id. 
161. Id.  
162. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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instances in which a person other than the owner needs to use the 
firearm for self-defense. For example, a police officer may be in a 
situation where she needs to use another officer’s gun in the field.163 
This type of prohibition may violate Second Amendment rights 
because a fellow police officer surely has the right to own a firearm 
and is the type of individual protected under the Second Amendment.  
Even if smart guns impose some sort of “who” restriction, a 
federal court would likely uphold the restriction. First, whatever 
burden a court found likely would be minimal. In Chovan, the 
restriction was within the scope of the Second Amendment because 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) placed a life ban on a class that historically had 
the right to bear arms for self-defense.164 In stark contrast, smart guns 
only prevent gun possession for those not already possessing a gun 
and only do so for the period during which that person chooses not to 
have a gun. Given this slight burden, it is highly unlikely that a court 
would find smart guns touch a “core” right, but more likely that they 
would regulate the manner of practicing that right.165 However, since 
rational basis is not appropriate, a court would likely undertake an 
intermediate scrutiny review. For the purposes of intermediate 
scrutiny, the government has a substantial interest in preventing 
violence involving guns.166 Assuming that those who lawfully own 
guns are the type of people not prone to commit violent acts with 
guns,167 then by keeping guns out of the hands of those who possess 
guns unlawfully, or for an illicit purpose, smart guns will reduce gun 
violence. Therefore, a smart-gun mandate would survive intermediate 
scrutiny because smart guns fulfill the important government interest 
of reducing violence while imposing a minimal burden on the ability 
to defend one’s self.168  
 
163. See Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 35 (“Some of 
the people that officers thought should be able to use their firearms 
included: partners, other officers within the department, officers from 
another county/state/jurisdiction, gunsmiths and armorers, trainers, 
and friends of the officer such as helpful citizens or spouses.”).  
164. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136.  
165. Id. at 1138. 
166. Id. at 1140. 
167. See Scott O’Grady, The Third Century NRA, http://home.nra.org/pdf/ 
thirdcenturynra_scottogrady_june17.pdf (“What many don’t seem to 
realize is that an armed, law-abiding citizenry bears no threat to anyone 
other than criminals and tyrants.”). 
168. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1140 (finding that a law that prevents a class 
of people who are more likely to commit violent acts with guns is 
tailored to satisfy the government’s goals).  
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C. An “Expenses” Restriction 
The last possible constitutional infringement arising from a law 
requiring that only smart guns be sold comes from the price of the 
technology. As noted earlier, smart guns will not be cheap. As 
discussed in Part II, measures that raise the cost of exercising Second 
Amendment rights may impose a burden if they “materially raise” the 
cost of owning a gun.169 According to Kwong, an increase on the cost 
of owning a gun does not impose a burden on Second Amendment 
rights so long as the increase in price to the consumers exists only to 
offset some cost associated with regulating the right.170 Essentially, 
the price increase cannot be an obstacle intended to deter the exercise 
of the right; it has to be tied to a legitimate purpose.  
Under this analysis, the price of smart guns does not likely 
constitute a burden on Second Amendment rights because the price is 
tied to new technology that ensures a higher degree of safety. The fact 
remains that this price hike may effectively deter many from 
purchasing a gun. But this was also the case in Kwong, and there, 
some deterrent effect was not enough to abrogate the New York 
law.171 However, the Second Circuit indicated that intermediate 
scrutiny could be appropriate for provisions that raise the price of a 
gun.172 Under intermediate scrutiny, a court would likely decide that 
in effectively preventing gun ownership, the cost would infringe on a 
“core” Second Amendment right. The severity of that burden would 
likely be substantial, considering that the cost of a smart gun is 
around twice that of a normal handgun.173 Thus, the analysis would 
turn on what important government interest such a price increase 
serves and how narrowly tailored the law forcing the price increase is 
to that government interest. The government interest would be the 
prevention of accidental shootings, suicides, harm to children, and gun 
violence in general. The means of achieving this goal are likely 
sufficiently tailored because the price increase in a smart gun is due to 
its new technology. That technology is tied to the government 
purpose of decreasing violence by keeping guns out of the hands of 
those with a propensity for violence. In any case, the rise in price  
169. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1542.  
170. Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 2696 (2014).  
171. See id. at 167–68 (“Indeed, the fact that the licensing regime makes the 
exercise of one’s Second Amendment rights more expensive does not 
necessarily mean that it ‘substantially burdens’ that right.”).  
172. See id. at 168 (“But we need not definitively decide that applying 
heightened scrutiny is unwarranted here because we agree with the 
District Court that Admin. Code § 10–131(a)(2) would, in any event, 
survive under the so-called ‘intermediate’ form of heightened scrutiny.”). 
173. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.  
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might not actually deter would-be gun owners from purchasing a gun 
because consumers may be willing to pay more for increased safety.174 
Thus, the price increase in smart guns would likely not be a 
constructional barrier to implementing a smart-gun-only regime.  
Conclusion  
While a constitutional challenge relating to the implementation of 
smart guns in America has yet to happen, it is not far off. Second 
Amendment rights have been highly regarded and disputed, and the 
onset of new technology associated with those rights will not be any 
different. Concerns regarding smart-gun technology are 
understandable, but as this Comment demonstrated, there is not yet 
a constitutional basis for objecting to smart-guns-only regime. It is 
important to note that just because a law that prevents the 
manufacturing or purchasing of any gun that is not a smart gun is 
constitutional, there are other barriers preventing smart guns from 
thriving in the market. Although the technology used in smart guns is 
valuable, the demand for the technology is still developing.175 For 
now, this means high prices, but that will change as factors in the 
market begin influencing manufactures and consumers. The point is 
that intelligent arguments can be crafted on both sides, but there is 
little reason to believe that any objection to laws that require all 
guns, manufactured or sold, to be smart guns has a basis in the 
Second Amendment.  
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174. See Volokh, supra note 45 (“If I had a child, and smart guns were 
reliable enough, I might well be willing to spend some extra money to 
get a smart gun instead of my current gun.”); Sandia National 
Laboratories, supra note 11, at 40–41 (indicating that some police 
officers may be willing to pay twice as much for smart guns). 
175. See Volokh, supra note 45 (observing that the incentive for manufac-
turers to develop a more affordable version of smart guns will increase 
as the market expands).  
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